Armenia’s estrangement tests Russia’s influence in former soviet sphere

Armenia’s participation in the CSTO has been effectively frozen since February 2024, with the nation largely boycotting the organization’s activities following a conflict with Azerbaijan. Yerevan has criticized the CSTO for failing to provide substantial support during the war.

“Armenia ‘de facto’ doesn’t participate in the CSTO’s operations,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated last week. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan declared on November 5 that “our interest in the CSTO has run its course.”

The CSTO’s inaction during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, where Russia and other member states – Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan – did not deploy troops despite the charter’s provisions, fueled Armenia’s disillusionment. Moscow maintains two military bases in Armenia, housing thousands of servicemen and border guards.

Azerbaijan, which withdrew from the CSTO in 1999, utilized weaponry acquired from Russia, along with Turkish and Israeli-made drones, to achieve military success. Pashinyan’s increasingly anti-Kremlin stance has been a point of contention since he assumed power in 2018 following protests against Russia-backed leaders, and Armenia is now pursuing membership in the European Union.

Analysts suggest Armenia’s actions are strategically timed, capitalizing on Russia’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine and the economic impact of Western sanctions. “Yerevan’s timing for these steps is very useful as Russia is too busy with its war in Ukraine and is to a large extent weakened by [Western] sanctions and Ukraine’s military strikes on Russian economic infrastructure, as well as a looming recession,” noted Alisher Ilkhamov, head of the London-based Central Asia Due Diligence think tank.

Russia’s influence in the region is waning as other nations explore alternative partnerships. A joint military exercise involving Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey recently took place in Nagorno-Karabakh and on the Caspian shore, demonstrating a shift in regional alliances.

Uzbekistan, a key economic power in Central Asia, has repeatedly left and rejoined the CSTO, currently maintaining observer status. Despite Russian pressure, Uzbekistan shows no immediate inclination to rejoin the military bloc. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev balances demonstrating loyalty to Moscow by attending events like the annual May 9 Victory Parade while also engaging with Western officials.

The summit’s primary focus is expected to be the security situation in Afghanistan, particularly the presence of armed groups, including ISIL in Khorasan Province (ISKP), which claimed responsibility for the March 2024 attack on a Moscow concert hall that resulted in over 140 deaths and over 550 injuries. CSTO states have increased border security along the Afghan-Tajik border, which stretches 1,344 kilometers.